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Grayscale Thoughts
Reactions to Brown v. Board of Education

Haylee Orlowski

Abstract

Photo by Mwesigwa Joel on Unsplash.

The 1954 Supreme Court case Brown v. Board of Education established that the segregation of
public schools based on race violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Across the United States, there was a spectrum of reactions to Brown. Responses ranged from
optimism and celebration to anger and violence. This paper surveys the varied reception of Brown
from politicians, parents, teachers, journalists, and other parties. It acknowledges the grayscale
of opinions within and across demographic lines. The purpose of this paper is to recognize the
complexity of a critical moment in the civil rights movement to prevent the oversimplification
of American history.
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The landmark 1954 Supreme Court case Brown v. Board of
Education did not simply reverse the precedent of “separate but equal” concerning school segregation; it turned
the infrastructure of society on its head. The Brown decision was a civil rights triumph, but implementation
created political tension and dissent across the nation.
School desegregation efforts that followed in the first
years after the decision were met with aggressive resistance from Southern states. Officials demonstrated
their disdain for the federal order through both public political defiance and personal statements. With no
clear plan or support from the federal government in
its formative years, Brown led to uncertainty and strong
initial reactions from individuals.

that suppressed the rights of African Americans in
their region. The statutes and de facto racism set in
place during this period only continued to expand over
the course of the early twentieth century, particularly
after the Supreme Court case Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)
ruled that “separate but equal” was constitutional. As
a result, segregation and Jim Crow laws permeated
Southern American culture. The government approved
of separating Americans based on their skin color, as
long as each group was provided “equal” access to spaces and resources. This “separate but equal” decision enabled racism and segregation without constraint, from
separate drinking fountains and local transportation to
public schools and movie theaters.2

The Brown decision was a civil
rights triumph, but implementation
created political tension and dissent
across the nation.

Following the end of World War II in 1945, African Americans began to call more adamantly for their rights and
equal treatment by their state and federal governments.
African American soldiers came home from serving on
the front lines of the global war and, alongside civilians, expressed their aversion to the mistreatment they
experienced in their hometowns. Vocalization against
a discriminatory system so deep-rooted in the hearts
of many white Southerners created incredibly contentious environments within Southern states. This tension between the two largest groups in the region led
to both civil and violent conflicts as African Americans
fought to be treated as equal to their white neighbors.3

Often oversimplified into camps of “for” or “against”
along racial divides, reactions to the Brown decision
were more complex. Feelings varied on the individual
level, with both African American and white individuals abandoning the dominant sentiments of their demographic in regard to Brown and school integration.
This paper surveys contemporary newspaper editorials,
opinion pieces, letters, and articles, along with more recent scholarship and reflections, to represent the broad
range of responses that Brown elicited. Evaluating
Brown from multiple perspectives prevents the oversimplification of American history.1

“Separate but Equal”

In response to the Reconstruction era after the Civil
War, Southerners sought to create an infrastructure
1 For a good overview of the civil rights movement, see Frederic O. Sargent, The Civil Rights Revolution: Events and Leaders, 1955-1968 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2004), and
Michael Ezra and Peter C. Mancall, Civil Rights Movement: People and Perspectives (Santa
Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2009). To read more on the court case Brown v. Board of Education, consult Diane Telgen, Defining Moments: Brown v. Board of Education (Detroit, MI:
Omnigraphics, 2005); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, From “Brown” to “Bakke”: The Supreme Court
and School Integration, 1954-1978 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); Lynn W. Zimmerman, “Reflections on Brown.” American Educational History Journal 33, no. 2 (2006):
89-96, Education Research Complete; Raphael Cassimere Jr., “Remembering Brown vs.
Board of Education,” The Crisis 101, no. 4 (1994): 10, 17-18, Education Research Complete;
and Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of “Brown v. Board of Education” and Black
America’s Struggle for Equality (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976). For further information
on Massive Resistance, refer to Francis M. Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance (New
York: George Braziller Inc., 1973) and Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race
and Politics in the South During the 1950’s (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1969). For additional readings on Southern responses to this decision, see R. Ray McCain, “Reactions to the United States Supreme Court Segregation Decision of 1954,” The
Georgia Historical Quarterly 52, no. 4 (1968): 371-87, www.jstor.org/stable/40578897; James J.
Kilpatrick, The Southern Case for School Segregation (New York: Crowell-Collier Press, 1962);
and Angie Maxwell, The Indicted South: Public Criticism, Southern Inferiority, and the Politics
of Whiteness (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014). Finally, for a
better understanding of contemporary sentiments regarding the case and its decision,
refer to “Text of 96 Congressmen’s Declaration on Integration,” New York Times, March
12, 1956, Proquest, and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), for the primary
legal material of the case and decision.
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Through court cases in Delaware,
Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and
Washington, DC, during the 1940s
and early 1950s, the NAACP fought
for equality within segregated higher
education.
African American activist organizations, such as the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and various grassroot groups
worked to counter racism on both state and national levels through the judicial system. One of the most
evident forms of mistreatment and disadvantage was
the inequality of public schools. Through court cases in Delaware, Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and
Washington, DC, during the 1940s and early 1950s, the
NAACP fought for equality within segregated higher
education, such as law schools. Though the specifics of
these “equalization suits” varied—some aimed for full
integration of African American and white students
(Delaware), while others aimed to secure better African American schools which were equal in resources
2 Waldo E. Martin Jr., “Brown v. Board of Education”: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1998), 76-80.
3 Kluger, Simple Justice, 224-227.

and facilities to white schools (Virginia and South Carolina)—all five cases sought school equality. Each case
was unsuccessful in the lower courts, and was appealed
to the U.S. Supreme Court. Since these cases did not
achieve the change African American activist groups
wanted, Baltimore lawyer Thurgood Marshall compiled
extensive evidence from each case to fight segregation
in public education. Marshall, the NAACP’s chief lawyer
since 1938, had detailed where to bring up the initial
suits, what schools should be desegregated, and who to
file each suit against so that the case would be its strongest when addressed by the federal judiciary.4

Legal Integration

Brown v. Board of Education first reached the Supreme
Court in 1952, only two years after Marshall convinced
the NAACP to challenge institutional segregation in
public education. The Brown case brought a compilation of the five different cases about school segregation before the Supreme Court. All five cases shared
the same argument: the “separate but equal” doctrine
in Plessy v. Ferguson violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Initially, the case was
sent back and forth between the state courts and Supreme Court, which made acquiring a court hearing a
lengthy process. After much deliberation, the Supreme
Court decided on June 9, 1952, that it would hear the
five school segregation cases. The Court combined the
cases into one trial set to begin in October 1952, which
was later postponed to December to be heard with other school cases.5

All five cases shared the same
argument: the “separate but equal”
doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The case was delivered with two distinct sides: pro-integration on the part of Thurgood Marshall and the
NAACP versus anti-integration on the part of South
Carolinian attorney John Davis. Marshall and the
NAACP accused “separate but equal” of violating individual rights based on the Fourteenth Amendment,
while Davis claimed schools separated by race served
the needs of ill-educated African Americans and that
the social experiment of integration would disadvantage these students rather than benefit them. After the
Brown case hearing ended, the Supreme Court Justices
deliberated throughout 1953. Newly appointed Chief
4 Wilkinson III, From “Brown” to “Bakke,” 27.
5 James T. Patterson, “Brown v. Board of Education”: A Civil Rights Milestone and Its Troubled
Legacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 21, 27.; Kluger, Simple Justice, 540.

Justice Earl Warren advanced his strong convictions in
the deliberations that “separate but equal” created de
jure inferiority of African Americans and was therefore
unconstitutional.6
Following many conferences regarding the case, the
Supreme Court released their decision on May 17, 1954.
Warren delivered the unanimous opinion. The opinion
was brief given the complexity and significance of the
case. Warren highlighted the importance of education
to the development of every individual, and the nation
holistically, by providing equal opportunity. He argued
“to separate them [African American students] from
others of similar age and qualifications solely because
of their race generates a feeling of inferiority.”7 The Supreme Court called for the disbanding of the “separate
but equal” doctrine in public education due to its violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause. Desegregation was to begin in all state public
education systems. Implementing this decision would
fundamentally alter the infrastructure of school systems in over half of the United States, including the
District of Columbia.

Initial Optimism

The implementation of Brown was seen as the beginning
of movement toward equal rights for all citizens. African American newspapers emphasized the popular sentiments of enthusiasm and hope in the weeks following
the Court’s decision. In the Pittsburgh Courier, editorialist George S. Schuyler wrote, “The whole atmosphere
for acceptance of such a decision as the Supreme Court
handed down the other day was slowly being created
in the Jim-Crow areas. If it hadn’t existed, the Court
would not have rendered the decision it did.”8 Schuyler
had been criticized for voicing this belief prior to the
Brown decision but was still not surprised by the outcome. Other national leaders were quoted in the same
May 29 issue of the Courier with positive views regarding Brown. The National Association of Colored Women
(NACW) president, Irene McCoy Haines, declared the
decision to be “the greatest judicial finding in favor
of the welfare of the Negro groups since the passage
of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.”9 Hopeful and confident testimonies, such as
these, were abundant in African American newspapers.
6 Kluger, Simple Justice, 541; Juan Williams, “Thurgood Marshall and Brown v.. Board
of Ed.,” Morning Edition, National Public Radio, December 8, 2003, https://www.npr.
org/2003/12/08/thurgood-marshall-and-brown-v-board-of-ed; Patterson, “Brown v. Board
of Education,” 64.
7 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
8 George S Schuyler, “High Court Decision Was No Surprise to Him,” opinion, Pittsburgh Courier, May 29, 1954.
9 “Nat’l Leaders Laud Ban on School Segregation: Supreme Court’s Decision Called
‘Long Over Due,’” Pittsburgh Courier, May 29, 1954.
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They articulated the popular opinion amongst the community, while also working to convince those who were
wary about Brown’s impact on the nation.
Thurgood Marshall enforced these hopeful sentiments.
When asked about Brown after his legal victory, Marshall often expressed how implementation was inevitable and would likely be swift, no matter the region. One
October article from The Washington Post and Times Herald best displays Marshall’s optimism about the future
of school integration: “If they can desegregate schools
in Baltimore, they can desegregate schools anywhere,
including Biloxi, [Mississippi].”10
A month later in the same newspaper, Marshall responded to news that Southern states were moving to establish private schools: “I don’t believe people would be
able to abolish school systems they have spent 70 or 80
years building up.”11 Marshall was certain these Southern threats to establish private schools were empty and
believed that people would not go through unnecessary
trouble to evade the inevitability of integration. Marshall’s initial confidence in public school integration’s
success was unwavering, but he did not realize the defiance Brown would face in the coming years.

The NAACP realized that legal success
did not translate to triumph over the
larger issue of racism that plagued
American society.
The initial elation expressed by Marshall, the NAACP,
and African American newspapers waned as they evaluated the logistics of this legal decision. In the first
month following the Brown decision, the NAACP realized that legal success did not translate to triumph over
the larger issue of racism that plagued American society. The June-July issue of their magazine, The Crisis,
was dedicated almost entirely to Brown and expressed
this awareness. In the editorial section of the issue, one
author wrote, “We also feel it necessary to temper our
exultation with the warning that this is a major battle won, not a campaign concluded.” They added that
having “unintelligent optimism and childish faith in
a court decision can blind us to the fact that legal abolition of segregation is not the final solution for the
social cancer of racism.”12 This editorial communicated
the NAACP’s optimism, but also acknowledged the fight
10 “NAACP Encouraged, Virginians Are Told,” Washington Post and Times Herald (19541959), October 12, 1954, Proquest.
11 “Integration Foes Seen Facing Suit,” Washington Post and Times Herald (1954-1959), November 29, 1954, Proquest.
12 “Segregation Decision,” editorial, The Crisis, June-July 1954, 352, https://books.
google.com/books?id=9VcEAAAAMBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=o#v=onepage&q&f=false.

66

James Madison Undergraduate Research Journal

for equality being far from over. They recognized the
opposition from Southerners who believed their state
rights and cultural customs were threatened by Brown,
but nonetheless planned to continue their pursuit of
school integration across the United States.

Compliance with Integration

Many states believed in the inevitability of this court
decision and agreed to implement integration as outlined in Brown. As Missouri State Attorney General John
Montgomery Dalton put forth in a ten-page statement
a month after the Brown decision: “It is the opinion of
this office that the provisions of the Missouri Constitution and Statutes relating to separate schools ‘for white
children and colored children’ are superseded by the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States and
are, therefore, unenforceable.” With this statement,
Dalton confirmed the plan of Missouri, a border state,
to move forward with integration, a position that contrasted from the Deep South.13
Accordingly, the majority of communities in Missouri
planned to integrate their schools by September 1955.
The reason for this pro-integration stance was because
state officials saw benefits in the desegregation ruling.
Funding the dual education system was a financial burden on the state and abolishing the system would considerably relieve the state budget. The closing of segregated schools was not perfect though. As part of the
cost savings, Missouri reduced the number of teaching
positions throughout the state. In Moberly, Missouri,
fifteen teaching contracts were not renewed, with eleven African Americans denied their positions. This case
displayed how inequality was a deeper-rooted and more
widespread issue in America than the general population was led to believe.14
Despite common anti-integration sentiments, some
Southern and border state officials admitted to the
decision’s inevitability and spoke in favor of gradual
implementation beginning at the local level. One such
person was distinguished Richmond attorney and Pulitzer Prize winner, David John Mays, who detailed in
his personal diary: “I am satisfied of the following: (1)
integration is certain to come; (2) Virginia people will
sacrifice their public school system, even today, to prevent integration; and (3) ultimately we must cushion
the impact of integration at the local level, although
under general statutes.” Mays’s concession showed how
13 Peter William Moran, “Border State Ebb and Flow: School Desegregation in Missouri, 1954-1999,” in With All Deliberate Speed: Implementing “Brown v. Board of Education,” eds.
Brian J. Daugherity and Charles C Bolton (Fayetteville, University of Arkansas Press),
179, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1ffjjdp.12.
14 Moran, “Border State Ebb and Flow,” 180.

not all white Southerners were aggressively fighting
for segregation.15
Intellectuals, newspaper editors, and ordinary citizens
also voiced their views. One writer and social critic,
Lillian Smith of Georgia, wrote to The New York Times:
“Then why are a few politicians protesting so angrily?
Perhaps because they feel they will now be handicapped
if the old crutch of ‘race’ is snatched away from them.”16
She expressed the resentment small pockets of Southerners felt toward those who wanted to defy the federal government and perpetrate racism for their own
agendas. Even individuals who would later oppose integration, such as Richmond News Leader editor James J.
Kilpatrick, initially spoke of the Court’s decision neutrally. Kilpatrick wrote in an editorial: “To bring the two
races together in the social intimacy of a classroom will
not come easily to the South. ... However, if the court
would consent to a more moderate program of integration, the prospect of preserving public education in
the South would be immeasurably improved.” He spoke
on the importance of preserving public education in
Virginia and explained how the Brown decision should
not cause a system of “tutors and private schools for
the well-to-do, and illiteracy for everyone else.”17 These
statements echoed the feelings of other white conservatives, who believed change should happen eventually,
but not in the form presented by the Court.
Amongst the reactions of white Southerners, many of
Virginia’s political and educational leaders were more
concerned about Brown’s long-term impact than the
often-described “immediate” anger. Bitterness was
one popular sentiment, as many believed the Supreme
Court infringed on the conventions of the South. College students at the University of Virginia claimed this
bitterness was justified; an excerpt from a 1954 editorial in the University of Virginia Cavalier Daily read, “It
is hard from a strict legal point of view to justify any
action contrary to law,” displaying wariness and annoyance more than an outright defiance of Brown.18 Additionally, some Virginia government officials voiced a variety of responses to the Supreme Court’s ruling. State
Superintendent of Public Instruction Dowell J. Howard
and State Attorney General J. Lindsay Almond Jr. both
expressed their apprehension regarding the decision
and its implementation, but also expressed their belief
that Virginia would be compliant with the new federal
15 David John Mays, Race, Reason, and Massive Resistance: The Diary of David J. Mays, 19541959, ed. James R. Sweeney (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2008), 36.
16 Lillian Smith, “Ruling on Schools Hailed,” letter to the editor, New York Times, May
31, 1954, Proquest.
17 James J. Kilpatrick, “The Decision,” editorial, Richmond News Leader, May 18, 1954.
18 “‘Violates’ Way of Life,” Cavalier Daily, May 18, 1954, quoted in Martin Jr., “Brown v.
Board of Education,” 206-207.

standard. As Almond Jr. stated, “The highest court in
the land has spoken and I trust that Virginia will approach the question realistically and endeavor to work
out some rational adjustment.”19

Parents and Teachers’ Unease

Though African Americans acknowledged the good
intentions of the Brown decision, many teachers and
parents were unsure whether the Supreme Court was
introducing the right course of action when it came to
African Americans attaining equal rights. The equalization suits which preceded Brown aimed to protect and
improve the resources and facilities already available to
African American students and teachers. These cases
intended to find a middle ground of progress which was
palatable to a larger portion of the public. Since the outcomes of these cases hardly succeeded in the ways those
who filed had hoped for—the results they sought either
succeeded with partial equality or were wholly denied
by the courts—Brown aimed to overhaul this separated system. Brown called for no equalization of different
school systems, but for the integration of students into
unified school systems. Brown introduced a new hope
for progress, but it failed to consider the inequalities
integration could create for African American students
and teachers. Overturning America’s deep-rooted cultural and social racism would take more effort than one
legal victory could achieve.

Overturning America’s deep-rooted
cultural and social racism would
take more effort than one legal
victory could achieve.
In Prince Edward County, Virginia, African American
parents watched legislators withhold funds for public
schools while elitist white-only private schools were established to prevent integration. In the state of Florida,
African Americans could not see the reality of Brown’s
proposed “fixes” for equal rights. Some wanted to focus
on equalization, or the equal distribution of resources between African American and white schools, which
was already occurring in some Southern states, rather
than uproot an entire infrastructure the population
knew and accepted. As Judge Constance Baker Motley
recounted, “They [the NAACP] brought a number of
cases seeking to equalize the salaries of Black teachers. They also brought cases which were directed at the
graduate school level because no separate facility had
been provided for Blacks at that level.” Motley explained
19 Quoted in Benjamin Muse, Virginia’s Massive Resistance (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961), 5.
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how the NAACP expected resistance, but nowhere near
the sophisticated or extensive lengths actually taken by
the opposition.20
Parents worried about the safety of their children and
advocated for maintaining segregation. Thus far, their
children had associated with those who were like them,
which was not the case when school integration started.
Additionally, some argued that maintaining segregated
public schools would keep violent and cruel resistance
efforts at bay. As The Chicago Defender noted in a 1957 article, “[The] Negro proportion of school enrollment in
Southern and border states has declined in ten states
and increased in seven states and the District of Columbia in five years since the original school segregation
cases went to the U.S. Supreme Court.” Parents’ caution
with the system of integration and its dangers led to
large groups of African Americans fleeing to the North,
where they believed they would experience less hostility and condemnation that many Southern whites harbored during this time period.21
Parents opted to send their children to other school
districts when their local schools closed. As one Prince
Edward County father, Phillip Ward, explained to his
daughter, “the whites don’t want Black kids to be with
their kids. They feel you’re below them.”22 Ward’s words
conveyed the reality many Southern African Americans faced, a reality that had been their worry since
the Brown decision. Though parents were defeated and
unhappy about the lack of substantial enforcement for
school integration, they were nonetheless determined
to see their children receive a proper education.
The dangers of integration African American parents
worried about were not always as civil as school closures;
one event demonstrated that violence was a real threat
facing African Americans seeking to integrate. In 1958,
Clinton High School in Clinton, Tennessee, was bombed
with dynamite after the state of Tennessee implemented integration on a local option basis. Integration in
Clinton first occurred during the 1956-1957 school year.
By the second day of classes, there were already threats
of violence. The National Guard was called to keep the
peace for the following two weeks. This temporary alleviation did not cease acts of violence and intimidation;
shots were fired, and dynamite was thrown into Afri20 Constance Baker Motley, “Eyes on the Prize; Interview with Constance Baker
Motley,” interview by Judith Vecchione, American Archive of Public Broadcasting, Library of Congress and WGBH, March 8, 1986, https://americanarchive.org/catalog/
cpb-aacip_151-zg6g15vcor.
21 “Percentage of Negro Pupils Drops in Dixie: Increases in Washington, D.C.,” The
Chicago Defender, December 14, 1957, Proquest.
22 Betty Jean Ward (African American Prince Edward County student) recounts a talk
with her father, in Kristen Green, Something Must Be Done About Prince Edward County: A
Family, a Virginia Town, a Civil Rights Battle, (New York: Harper Perennial, 2015), 149.
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can American communities. The principal of Clinton
High School even faced bomb threats by angry white
townspeople. This tension over integration came to a
breaking point when the school was bombed one night
in October, 1958. Three separate explosions obliterated
the interior of the school, causing damage which led
the local newspaper publisher to predict that “it would
be quite a while before classes can be resumed at the
school.”23 A statement released by Clinton Police Chief
Francis Moore explained how there was “no doubt
that this dynamiting is connected with integration of
the school.”24 Despite two years of integration, white
Southerners still performed extreme measures to express their opposition. Clinton High School’s bombing,
and other instances that paralleled it, made national
news and further heightened the worries of African
American parents.

Many African American teachers were
dismissed from their jobs because
white teachers were given priority in the
integrated school market.
African American teachers also experienced anxiety
in light of their diminishing job opportunities as a result of Brown. When schools were segregated, African
American teachers regularly had the ability to teach at
the schools of their own race, since the teaching profession was segregated for teachers as much as it was
for students. Brown did not make any claims for the desegregation of teachers as schools integrated with one
another. As a result, many African American teachers
were dismissed from their jobs because white teachers
were given priority in the integrated school market.
Written only days after the passing of Brown, one Chicago Defender article noted that “Officials of several states
have said they would not employ Negro teachers in integrated schools.” At Athens College in Alabama, the administration team bluntly denied the possibility of ever
hiring African American teachers. The Crisis included
a letter from the registrar of the college to the youth
secretary of the NAACP in its June 1954 issue in which
the registrar went so far as to proclaim “We will probably never hire any of them [African American teachers].
Your northers [sic] ‘Yankee’ friends will employ them.
Not us…. Don’t insult us any more with such expectations.” Implementing widespread desegregation was
only required at the student level, leaving many African
American teachers vulnerable. Due to this lack of federal integration orders at the faculty level, African American teachers were stripped of any hope for job security,
23 “High School at Clinton Dynamited: Tennessee Offers Reward of $5000; FBI Joins
Inquiry,” Washington Post and Times Herald, October 6, 1958, Proquest.
24 “High School at Clinton Dynamited.”

leaving many bitter. Some African American teachers
did not want desegregation to take place because it cost
them career opportunities and created a new system of
exclusivity based upon de facto racism.25

Opposition to Integration

One of the most prominent African Americans who
spoke in opposition to the Brown decision was Zora Neale Hurston. Hurston was a Southern anthropologist,
folklorist, and writer who showed no support for desegregation. Her views demonstrated a stark contrast
to the dominant opinion of African Americans at the
time; she was a fervent supporter of institutions separated by race. Hurston believed separate institutions
preserved and promoted racial pride. She argued that
desegregated schools put African American children
in the position to feel inferior to their white peers
and have to face this inferiority complex head-on. In a
letter to the editor of a Florida paper, Hurston wrote,
“How much satisfaction can I get from a court order
for somebody to associate with me who does not wish
me near them?” Hurston expressed her sentiments: “I
regard the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court as insulting rather than honoring my race.” Unlike many African Americans who reacted to the Brown decision with
hopeful wariness, Hurston stated her contempt openly
and called for others to express their frustrations. She
believed there was no need for sympathy or respect
for those who saw race as a “tragedy of color.” Hurston
believed those who shared these opinions overlooked
the possible benefits of segregated education and that
groups rallying in support of Brown did not consider all
the factors and effects of the Supreme Court’s decision
before pressuring others to support it. She continued
her support for segregated education and her preference for equalization by explaining, “Negro schools in
the state are in very good shape and on the improve.”
In Hurston’s eyes, equalization and gradualism proved a
more promising movement toward equal rights for African Americans than forced progress.26

Massive Resistance

Virginia Senator Harry F. Byrd’s immediate response
represents the intense backlash and criticism surrounding Brown. He argued it was “the most serious blow that
has been struck against the rights of the states in a
matter vitally affecting their authority and welfare.”27
25 Darrell Garwood, “Kill Jim Crow Schools: U.S. Supreme Court Rules Unanimously
in Ending Segregation in Education,” The Chicago Defender, May 22, 1954, Proquest; F. D.
Ward, letter to Herbert L. Wright, 2 June 1954, The Crisis, June-July 1954, 336.
26 Zora Neale Hurston, “Court Order Can’t Make Races Mix,” letter to the editor,
Orlando Sentinel, The Public Thought, August 11, 1955, quoted in Martin Jr., “Brown v. Board
of Education,” 209-212.
27 For a biography of Harry F. Byrd, see Ronald L. Heinemann, Harry Byrd of Virginia

Byrd believed the Supreme Court’s decision for school
integration was outside the federal government’s jurisdiction and scope, and he reacted defiantly when other
state officials suggested compliance to Brown. As head
of Virginia’s Democratic Party machine, Byrd rallied
support against integration throughout the state. Byrd
did not conduct his agenda publicly, however, but gathered support behind the scenes through persuasion of
other Virginia government officials, such as Governor
Thomas B. Stanley.28

Byrd used his political prowess,
knowledge of loophole manipulation,
and persuasive speech to change minds
from compliance to resistance.
Byrd used his political prowess, knowledge of loophole
manipulation, and persuasive speech to change minds
from compliance to resistance. He began by working
with his Southern colleagues in the District of Columbia to prepare for an all-Southern resistance gesture.
He also supported the idea of interposition, in which a
state had a right to “interpose its sovereignty” between
its citizens and the federal government. In these subtle
ways, Byrd persuaded other Virginia and Southern officials. Governor Thomas B. Stanley’s change of heart was
most evident, as he initially accepted the Brown decision
in May 1954, but within two short months threatened to
use all of his power to continue segregated schools in
Virginia. By September 1954, Stanley called for a board,
known as the Gray Commission,29 to discuss Brown and
determine the best course of action to resist its implementation. Stanley’s stance completely changed, as his
original words—“I am confident the people of Virginia
will receive the opinion of the Supreme Court calmly
and take time to carefully dispassionately consider the
situation before coming to conclusions on steps which
should be taken”—became null at the hands of Byrd’s
influence. Byrd’s puppeteering caught the attention of
notable officials and gained momentum.30
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1996).
28 “Governor to Call Meeting of State Leaders on School Problem: Stanley Sees No
Need Now for Assembly Meeting,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 18, 1954; Muse, Virginia’s Massive Resistance, 26; Brian J. Daugherity, “‘Keep on Keeping On’: African Americans
and the Implementation of Brown v. Board of Education in Virginia,” in With All Deliberate
Speed: Implementing Brown v. Board of Education, eds. Brian J. Daugherity and Charles C.
Bolton (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2008), 43-44.
29 A commission appointed by Governor Thomas B. Stanley in August 1954. The purpose of the Gray Commission was to investigate the effects of the Brown decision and
to make implementation recommendations to the Virginia legislature. All members of
the commission were white, male legislators from the Fourth District (Southside) of
Virginia, where the state had its most concentrated African American populations. By
November 1955, the Gray Commission provided its final report, where they offered the
idea of a “local option,” which granted each locality in the state the right to process
desegregation at its own speed, and recommended amending the Virginia State Constitution, Section 141, to allow “tuition grants” to white parents for the private education
of their children.
30 Muse, Virginia’s Massive Resistance, 22, 27; Brian J. Daugherity, “‘Keep on Keeping
On,’” 44; “Governor to Call Meeting,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, May 18, 1954.
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Byrd encouraged his resistance agenda amongst other
Southern representatives in DC more aggressively two
years after the original Brown decision. Southern senators and representatives deliberated this agenda set in
opposition to integration. On March 12, 1956, Georgia
Senator Walter George introduced the infamous “Declaration of Constitutional Principles,” which would later be known as the Southern Manifesto. The document
made headlines as it publicly contested the federal government’s involvement and claimed, “This unwarranted exercise of power by the court, contrary to the Constitution, is creating chaos and confusion in the states
primarily affected.” Furthermore, the Brown decision
was “destroying the amicable relations between white
and Negro races that have been created through ninety years of patient effort by the good people of both
races. It has planted hatred and suspicion where there
has been heretofore friendship and understanding.”
This declaration exhibited the first strong example of
Massive Resistance. The opposition movement would
exist in the South for the next decade, especially after
Brown II’s (1955) “all deliberate speed” ruling,31 which
made integration difficult for the federal government
to enforce. Massive Resistance was a strategic movement that utilized state legislation to prevent school
integration by passing laws and policies in opposition.
Byrd endorsed its development and publication along
with Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, who
wrote the early drafts of the Southern Manifesto. Thus,
Byrd secured his place as the founder of the Massive
Resistance movement that would permeate the South.32

Massive Resistance was a strategic
movement that utilized state legislation
to prevent school integration by passing
laws and policies in opposition.
While his “behind closed doors” and “official” proceedings occurred amidst other Southern representatives,
Byrd continued to rally support for resistance in his
home state of Virginia. On July 2, 1956, he called Governor Stanley, State Senator Garland Gray, and other
reliable leaders of his political organization for a secret
conference to discuss the necessary action for defiance.
During the meeting, Byrd convinced these officials to
charge full speed ahead in their anti-integration efforts
through legislative measures. He also convinced Stan31 “With all deliberate speed” was a portion of the Brown II ruling which allowed local
school boards to integrate African American and white students at a pace they deemed
appropriate. This vague phrase enabled many Southern states to slow down, and even
halt, any progress of the original Brown decision. Though this phrase was intended by
the Supreme Court to soften the blow of inevitable integration, it resulted in greater
resistance by states.
32 Wilhoit, Politics of Massive Resistance, 51-53; “96 Congressmen’s Declaration on Integration” New York Times, 12 March 1956.
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ley to hold a special session to discuss Virginia’s plan of
resistance. In compliance with this suggestion, Stanley
called for a special legislative session of the Virginia
General Assembly on August 27, 1956. The session was
held in Richmond and lasted twenty-seven days. During
this time, they passed twenty-three acts regarding the
school segregation issue. Passing these acts began the
legislative crusade of Massive Resistance in Virginia.
Though the legislators claimed the concept of “local
option” was in practice, schools that opted for integration would be promptly “closed and removed from the
public-school system.”33

Spread of Massive Resistance

Virginia’s resistance created a path for other states,
such as Georgia, to follow. Prior to Brown, Georgia was
in the process of making plans for state school equalization, regardless of the resistance within the state.
Many white Georgians maintained similar sentiments
and agendas as their Deep South and Virginia counterparts, with varying expressions of defiance and resistance. To ensure the legal nullification of the Brown decision, Georgia government officials created a proposal
that provided educational vouchers to students via the
state and local governments. The vouchers would separate children of different races without technically
constituting “discrimination;” this proposal became
known as the “private school plan.” It received backlash
nationwide by both whites and African Americans once
it passed as an amendment to the state’s constitution.
This new amendment provided the Georgia state legislature with a green light to propose and pass more anti-integration laws, under the condition that these laws
would not pose legal challenges or explicitly contradict
the federal ruling. The resulting laws and other legislation passed in Georgia, such as the ability to close public
schools that were federally ordered to desegregate, became part of the Massive Resistance movement as other
Southern states followed these procedures. As long as
school segregation fit within the legal jurisdiction of
states, integration would be resisted with “all deliberate speed.” The “private school plan” amendment displayed Southern segregationists’ determination to preserve an institution teeming with discrimination and
ignorance.34
Segregationists did not exist solely in the Southern
states. Former border states, such as Delaware, employed considerable resistance against school integra33 Muse, Virginia’s Massive Resistance, 28-31.
34 Thomas V. O’Brien, “Defiance, Protest, and Compromise: The Struggle to Implement Brown in Georgia, 1950-1973,” in With All Deliberate Speed: Implementing Brown v.
Board of Education, eds. Brian J. Daugherity and Charles C. Bolton (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2008), 95-96.

tion. Many Delaware citizens held Southern-minded
and traditionalist views pertaining to segregation, despite a small African American population. When there
was a shortage of funding for higher education, Delaware officials proposed integrating Delaware State
College, a historically African American college, and
the University of Delaware, a historically white institution; both African American and white citizens of the
state opposed the plan. Though some school districts
were integrated, which received praise from northern
neighbors, the Brown decision incited cruel and hateful
opposition in other communities in the state, such as
Milford in the fall of 1954. When school began in September, the formerly white high school in Milford admitted eleven African American students for the school
year. By September 20, the local government closed all
Milford schools indefinitely in an act of resistance. One
week later, Milford High School reopened. State and local police were present as protestors threatened white
and African American students alike for attending class.
Some groups, such as the National Association for the
Advancement of White People (NAAWP), went so far in
their hate crimes as to hand out sheets of hateful messages, call and threaten African American parents for
sending their children to a formerly white-only school,
and scratch the names of the Milford Eleven from enrollment records. The “Milford Incident,” as it was commonly referred to, showcased how Massive Resistance
became practiced in multiple states within the turn of
a year.35 This incident exemplifies the direct opposition
over the outcome of Brown.

change. The decision affected every American, providing a broad spectrum of emotional sentiments regarding its ruling. Many people on both sides believed the
decision was merely a “cultural shock” and “quick fix”
to a larger and more deeply embedded social problem
in America. The acceptance or defiance of Brown, and
of the larger civil rights movement, was not a position
taken by groups wholly as Americans are often taught.
This distorted narrative too broadly simplifies an event
and movement which called each American to reflect on
their personal values and what is meant by the idea of
equality.36

Conclusion

The Brown decision caused an uproar across the United States. Integration would not be fully implemented
until an entire decade after the Supreme Court’s initial decision. The Massive Resistance movement maintained a steady prominence during this time, as many
states continued to defy the federal government’s jurisdiction. Brown challenged the infrastructure of Southern society, which was based on Jim Crow laws and institutional segregation to maintain the “inferior” status
of African Americans. Though this landmark case was
a great victory for the American civil rights movement
in the 1950s and 1960s and the advancement of equality
among all citizens, its ambiguity and brevity helped little in the guidance of racial issues and proper means of
desegregating public schools.
Brown served as a catalyst for cultural and legislative
35 Bradley Skelcher, “Promises of Brown: Desegregating Education in Delaware, 19501968” in With All Deliberate Speed: Implementing Brown v. Board of Education, eds. Brian J.
Daugherity and Charles C. Bolton (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2008), 155161; June Shagaloff, “Desegregation of Public Schools in Delaware,” The Journal of Negro
Education 24, no. 3 (1955): 197-198, https://doi.org/10.2307/2293451.

36 Wilkinson III, From “Brown” to “Bakke,” 48-49.
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